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Abstract
We discuss four common mistakes in the teaching and textbooks of modal
logic. The first one is missing the axiom ✸ϕ ↔ ¬✷¬ϕ, when choosing ✸ as
the primitive modal operator, misunderstanding that ✷ and ✸ are symmetric.
The second one is forgetting to make the set of formulas for filtration closed
under subformulas, when proving the finite model property through filtration,
neglecting that ✷ϕ and ✸ϕ may be abbreviations of formulas. The third one
is giving wrong definitions of canonical relations in minimal canonical models
that are unmatched with the primitive modal operators. The final one is mis-
understanding the rule of necessitation, without knowing its distinction from
the rule of modus ponens. To better understand the rule of necessitation, we
summarize six ways of defining deductive consequence in modal logic: omitted
definition, classical definition, ternary definition, reduced definition, bounded
definition, and deflationary definition, and show that the last three definitions
are equivalent to each other.
Keywords: modal logic; deductive consequence; deduction theorem; ax-
iomatic systems; filtration; minimal canonical models; finite model property
1 Primitive Modal Operators and the d/Dual Ax-
iom
In modal logic, we can set ✷ as the primitive modal operator, and define ✸ to be
¬✷¬ as a derived operator, as in [3]. We can also set ✸ as the primitive operator,
defining ✷ to be ¬✸¬, as in [2]. Though the two options seem totally symmetric,
they are actually not. In constructing axiomatic systems, the choice of different
primitive modal operators may lead to results that are not totally symmetric.
For example, consider the minimal normal modal logic K. When ✷ is the prim-
itive modal operator, apart from the axioms and rules for classical propositional
logic (PC henceforth), the axiomatic system needs only include the following axiom
(schema) and rule of inference,
K ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ)
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RN
ϕ
✷ϕ
as well as the definition ✸ϕ =df ¬✷¬ϕ, which amounts to adding the following
axiom.
dual ✸ϕ↔ ¬✷¬ϕ
But when ✸ is the primitive modal operator, apart from PC,K,RN and the following
axiom used as a definition,
Dual ✷ϕ↔ ¬✸¬ϕ
we still need to augment dual. From another perspective, if we do not take definitions
as a part of the axiomatic system, when choosing ✷ as primitive, apart from PC
and RN, we need only one more axiom, namely K; when choosing ✸ as primitive,
however, we need two axioms, namely K and dual. Why is there such an asymmetry?
The reason is that, the axiom K and the rule RN are intrinsically using ✷ rather
than ✸. This makes the following rule derivable from K, RN, and dual (plus PC).
RE
ϕ↔ ψ
✷ϕ↔ ✷ψ
The derivation is as follows.
(1) ϕ↔ ψ hypothesis
(2) ϕ→ ψ, ψ → ϕ (1), PC
(3) ✷(ϕ→ ψ), ✷(ψ → ϕ) (2), RN
(4) ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ), ✷(ψ → ϕ)→ (✷ψ → ✷ϕ) K
(5) ✷ϕ→ ✷ψ, ✷ψ → ✷ϕ (3), (4), PC
(6) ✷ϕ↔ ✷ψ (5), PC
With RE, Dual can be derived from dual, as shown below.
(1) ✸¬ϕ↔ ¬✷¬¬ϕ dual
(2) ¬✸¬ϕ↔ ✷¬¬ϕ (1), PC
(3) ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ PC
(4) ✷ϕ↔ ✷¬¬ϕ (3), RE
(5) ✷ϕ↔ ¬✸¬ϕ (2), (4), PC
Hence, when ✷ is primitive, there is no need to add Dual when dual is available.
Dually, if we want to derive dual from Dual, we need the following rule.
re
ϕ↔ ψ
✸ϕ↔ ✸ψ
With re, we can analogously derive dual from Dual as follows.
(1) ✷¬ϕ↔ ¬✸¬¬ϕ Dual
(2) ¬✷¬ϕ↔ ✸¬¬ϕ (1), PC
(3) ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ PC
(4) ✸ϕ↔ ✸¬¬ϕ (3), re
(5) ✸ϕ↔ ¬✷¬ϕ (2), (4), PC
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The problem, however, is that with only K, RN, and PC, even with Dual, we can
not obtain re. With RE (which can be obtained from K, RN, and PC) and Dual,
we can only obtain
ϕ↔ ψ
✸¬ϕ↔ ✸¬ψ
,
ϕ↔ ψ
✸¬¬ϕ↔ ✸¬¬ψ
,
ϕ↔ ψ
✸¬¬¬ϕ↔ ✸¬¬¬ψ
· · · · · ·
but not re. Thus we can not derive dual from Dual. Thereby when ✸ is primitive,
apart from Dual used as a definition, we have to add dual too. Since we have proved
that Dual can be derived from dual, the axiom Dual used as a definition can be
omitted. This implies that whichever of ✷ and ✸ is chosen as primitive, dual is
indispensable (either as a definition, or as an axiom), while Dual can be omitted.
Let K˜ be the axiomatic system consisting of PC, K, RN, and Dual. We will
prove rigorously that dual is not derivable in K˜.
Proposition 1. 0
K˜
✸p↔ ¬✷¬p
Proof. Consider M = (W,R, V ) and the following non-standard semantics.
• M, w |= ✸ϕ iff ϕ = ¬ψ and there exists u ∈ W such that wRu and M, u 6|= ψ;
• M, w |= ✷ϕ iff for all u ∈ W , wRu implies M, u |= ϕ.
The semantics of propositional connectives is defined as usual. It is easily verified
that PC and K are valid under this semantics (with respect to the class of all frames),
and MP and RN preserves validity. Notice that M, w |= ✸¬ϕ iff there exists u ∈ W
such that wRu and M, u 6|= ϕ. Thus Dual, namely ✷ϕ ↔ ¬✸¬ϕ is also valid
under this semantics. Hence, if ⊢
K˜
✸p ↔ ¬✷¬p, then ✸p ↔ ¬✷¬p is valid too.
But consider the counter-model M = ({w}, {(w,w)}, V ), where V (p) = {w}. Then
M, w |= ¬✷¬p but M, w 6|= ✸p. Therefore, 0
K˜
✸p↔ ¬✷¬p.
Early textbooks in modal logic (such as [16, 13, 12]) usually take ✷ to be prim-
itive, with dual a definition rather than an axiom added to the axiomatic systems.
Moreover, Dual is not required as an axiom. The prevalence of [2] makes more and
more people choose ✸ to be primitive. They may take for granted from duality that
only Dual should be added as a definition and dual is not required as an axiom.
The above analysis shows that this thought is incorrect. If ✸ is taken as primitive,
the axiomatic system with only Dual and without dual is incomplete. A newly pub-
lished textbook [14] on neighborhood semantics just made this mistake. On page 54,
the author claims that the minimal modal logic E under neighborhood semantics
can be axiomatized by PC, RE, and Dual. But a slight modification of the proof
of Proposition 1 will show that this axiomatic system is incomplete, as dual is not
derivable in the system. The correct axiomatization is to take dual instead of Dual
as an axiom.
In semantics, the choice of primitive modal operators will affect the definition
of filtration and minimal canonical models, as well as the syntax of subformulas.
Without caution, some subtle mistakes are likely to be made, which will be shown
in Section 2 and 3.
Given a set of propositional variables PV , without other specification, we assume
the language of modal logic is defined as follows.
L✸ ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ→ ϕ) | ✸ϕ,
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where p ∈ PV . The other logical connectives (⊤,∨,∧,↔) are defined as usual.
2 Filtration and Finite Model Property
The basic idea of filtration is as follows. Given a formula ϕ and its counter-model
M, the satisfiability of ϕ only depends on the satisfiability of the subformulas of ϕ.
Since the subformulas are finite, the possibilities of the satisfiability of them are also
finite. Thus, if we take those points in M that satisfy the same subformulas of ϕ
to be the same, we obtain a finite model Mf . If we define in Mf an accessibility
relation that is closely related to M such that the satisfiability of the subformulas
in Mf is equivalent to that in M for all subformulas of ϕ, then we obtain a finite
counter-model of ϕ.
Given a model M = (W,R, V ) and a set of formulas Σ ⊆ L✸, we first define an
equivalence relation ∼Σ ⊆W ×W as follows.
w ∼Σ w
′ iff for all ϕ ∈ Σ,M, w |= ϕ⇔M, w′ |= ϕ.
Define the equivalence class |w|Σ of w as follows.1
|w|Σ = {w
′ ∈W | w ∼Σ w
′}
When Σ is finite, the set of equivalence classes induced by Σ is also finite. When
Σ is used for filtration, it is required to be subformula closed, i.e., every subformula
of every formula in Σ is also in Σ. In the sequel, we denote by SubΣ the set of all
subformulas of all formulas in Σ. If Σ is a singleton {ϕ}, we denote SubΣ by Subϕ.
Now recall the definition of filtration.
Definition 2 (filtration). Mf = (W f , Rf , V f ) is a filtration of M = (W,R, V )
through Σ, if the following conditions are satisfied.
(1) W f = {|w|Σ | w ∈W};
(2) for all w, u ∈W , if wRu then |w|Rf |u|;
(3) for all w, u ∈ W , if |w|Rf |u|, then for all✸ϕ ∈ Σ, ifM, u |= ϕ thenM, w |= ✸ϕ;
(4) for all w ∈W and p ∈ PV ∩ Σ, |w| ∈ V f (p) iff w ∈ V (p).
Such an Rf is also called a filtration of R (through Σ).
A few remarks about filtration.
Remark 3. If Σ is subformula closed and the primitive modal operator is ✸, then
(3) above implies
(3′) For all w, u ∈ W , if |w|Rf |u|, then for all ✷ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, w |= ✷ϕ then
M, u |= ϕ.
But (3′) does not imply (3). The reason is that ✷ϕ is actually an abbreviation
of ¬✸¬ϕ. When ✷ϕ ∈ Σ, by the subformula closure of Σ, we also have ¬ϕ ∈ Σ,
and thus we could prove (3′) using (3) by contraposition. But conversely, when
✸ϕ ∈ Σ, we can not obtain ¬ϕ ∈ Σ, and thus can not prove (3) using (3′) by
contraposition. On this point, filtrations are different from canonical models and
1We often omit the subscript Σ if no confusion occurs.
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ultrafilter extensions. In canonical models and ultrafilter extensions, the definitions
using ✷ can dually be replaced by ✸, and vice versa. More precisely, the canonical
relation RΛ for the logic Λ can be defined by: RΛwu iff for all ϕ ∈ u, ✸ϕ ∈ w. It
can also be defined by: RΛwu iff for all ✷ϕ ∈ w, ϕ ∈ u. The two definitions are
completely equivalent (assuming Λ contains dual). Analogously, the accessibility
relation Rue of the ultrafilter extension of M = (W,R, V ) can be defined by: Ruewu
iff for all X ∈ v, ✸RX ∈ u.2 It can also be defined by: Ruewu iff for all ✷RX ∈ u,
X ∈ v. The two definitions are also equivalent. But for filtrations, (3) and (3′) are
not equivalent.
Remark 4. If the primitive modal operator is ✷, for the inductive proof of the case
✷ϕ for the filtration theorem below, (3) in Definition 2 should be replaced by (3′).
Then (3′) implies (3) but (3) does not imply (3′). The reasons are as above.
Remark 5. If both ✷ and ✸ are primitive modal operators, for the inductive proof
of the cases ✷ϕ and ✸ϕ for the filtration theorem below, (3) in Definition 2 should
be replaced by (3′′).
(3′′) For all w, u ∈ W , if |w|Rf |u|, then for all ✸ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, u |= ϕ then M, w |=
✸ϕ, and for all ✷ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, w |= ✷ϕ then M, u |= ϕ.
i.e., the conjunction of (3) and (3′′).
Note that the definition of Rf in Definition 2 is not constructive. The following
two particular Rf s are often used.
Definition 6 (smallest filtration, largest filtration). Given a model M = (W,R, V )
and a set of formulas Σ ⊆ L✸, the smallest filtration R
s and the largest filtration
Rl of R through Σ is defined respectively as follows. For all w, u ∈W ,
(1) |w|Rs|u| iff there exist w′ ∈ |w| and u′ ∈ |u| such that w′Ru′;
(2) |w|Rl|u| iff for all ✸ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, u |= ϕ then M, w |= ✸ϕ.
Similarly, when the primitive modal operator is ✷, (2) should be replaced by (2′)
below.
(2’) |w|Rl|u| iff for all ✷ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, w |= ✷ϕ then M, u |= ϕ.
If both ✷ and ✸ are primitive, then (2) should be replaced by (2′′) below.
(2′′) |w|Rl|u| iff for all ✸ϕ ∈ Σ, if M, u |= ϕ then M, w |= ✸ϕ and for all ✷ϕ ∈ Σ,
if M, w |= ✷ϕ then M, u |= ϕ.
The equivalence of satisfiability of related formulas between a model and its
filtration is ensured by the following filtration theorem.
Theorem 7 (Filtration Theorem). Let Mf = (W f , Rf , V f ) be a filtration of M =
(W,R, V ) through Σ, which is subformula closed. Then for all w ∈W and ϕ ∈ Σ,
M, w |= ϕ iff Mf , |w| |= ϕ.
It should be emphasized that the subformula closed property of Σ is critical in the
proof of the filtration theorem; otherwise, we could not use the inductive hypothesis
to complete the proof.
2
✸RX = {w ∈ W | ∃x ∈ X Rwx}, ✷RX = {w ∈ W | ∀x ∈W (Rwx⇒ x ∈ X)}.
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Sometimes using the subformulas of the formula in question directly will not
achieve our goal. We have to supplement some other formulas for filtration. It
should be noticed that after adding more formulas we still have to keep the set of
formulas to be subformula closed. At this place, both [3] and [15] made an incautious
mistake in the proof of the finite model property of K5.
The proof in [3, p. 145] goes as follows.
First, K5 = K⊕✸✷p→ ✷p is characterized by the class of Euclidean
frames. Let M be a countermodel for a formula ϕ based on a Euclidean
frame. Again, a filtration of M through Subϕ need not be Euclidean. So
let us try a bigger filter, say,
Σ = Subϕ ∪ {✸✷ϕ | ✷ψ ∈ Subϕ}.
Let N be the largest filtration of M through Σ. We show that its under-
lying frame G = (V, S) is Euclidean.
Suppose |x|S|y| and |x|S|z|, for some |x|, |y|, |z| ∈ V , and prove that
|y|S|z|. By the definition of S, we need to show that N, |y| |= ✷ψ implies
N, |z| |= ψ, for every ✷ψ ∈ Σ. So let ✷ψ ∈ Σ and N, |y| |= ✷ψ. Then
N, |x| |= ✸✷ψ and, by the filtration theorem, M, x |= ✸✷ψ, from which
M, x |= ✷ψ, since M is a model for K5. Therefore, N, |x| |= ✷ψ and
N, |z| |= ψ.
Notice that since [3] takes ✷ as primitive, the largest filtration Rf is defined by (2′)
in Definition 6 instead of (2). In the proof, the conclusion N, |x| |= ✸✷ψ is obtained
from ✸✷ψ ∈ Σ and the claim in Remark 3: when ✷ is primitive, (3′) implies (3).
The whole proof seems innocuous and is much shorter than the standard proof using
finite bases3. Unfortunately, the proof is incorrect!
What is incorrect is that Σ is not subformula closed as it appears. The author
thought wrongly that Sub✸✷ψ = {✸✷ψ,✷ψ} ∪ Subψ. If this is case, then the
proof does go through. The problem is that ✸ is not a primitive operator, but the
abbreviation of ¬✷¬. Hence,
Sub✸✷ψ = Sub¬✷¬✷ψ = {¬✷¬✷ψ,✷¬✷ψ,¬✷ψ,✷ψ} ∪ Subψ.
But ✷¬✷ψ and ¬✷ψ are not in Σ. Can the problem be solved by supplementing
these two formulas? No, because the proof requires that if ✷¬✷ψ ∈ Σ then ✸✷¬✷ψ
must also be in Σ. But then it will introduce more formulas of the form ✷ψ, and
the proof requires the formulas with ✸ prefixed to these formulas must also be in
Σ. Repeating this process, Σ will become an infinite set. To complete the proof, we
have to prove that Σ has finite base with respect to M. Can we solve the problem by
just taking both ✷ and ✸ to be primitive? No. Though Σ is now subformula closed,
the definition for Rl has to be revised as (2′′) in Definition 6 . Then to prove that
N is Euclidean we have to consider both (2) and (2′′), which requires Σ to satisfy
not only that ✷ψ ∈ Σ implies ✸✷ψ ∈ Σ, but also that ✷ψ ∈ Σ implies ✸✷ψ ∈ Σ.
Thereby Σ becomes infinite again.
3See Definition 8.
6
[15, p. 176] uses an infinite set for filtration to prove the finite model property
of K5. The author first defines ✷Γ = {✷ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ} and ✸Γ = {✸ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ}, where
Γ = Subϕ. Then he defines Γ• = Γ ∪✷Γ ∪✸Γ and Γn below.
Γ0 = Γ
Γn+1 = (Γn)
•
Finally he defines Γ∗ =
⋃
n≥0 Γn, which is just the smallest set that contains Subϕ
and is closed under prefixing ✷ and ✸ . Then Γ∗ is used for filtration. Though Γ∗
is an infinite set, it has finite base with respect to Euclidean models. The proof is
almost right, except that Γ∗ is not subformula closed. If both ✷ and ✸ are primitive,
then Γ∗ is indeed subformulas closed. But the textbook takes only ✷ to be primitive.
Then ✸ϕ is just the abbreviation of ¬✷¬ϕ, whose subformulas include not only ϕ
but also ¬ϕ. By the definition of Γ∗, we can not ensure that ¬ϕ is also in Γ∗ if ϕ ∈ Γ∗.
This is a very elusive mistake. Compared to the mistake in [3, p. 145] above, this
mistake is more easily to be corrected: just take SubΓ∗ instead of Γ∗ for filtration.
Another option is to take both ✷ and ✸ to be primitive in the language. Then Γ∗
is subformula closed. Though in verifying that the filtration model is Euclidean, we
have to consider both (2) and (2′) in Definition 6, the proof still goes through, since
Γ∗ is closed under prefixing both ✷ and ✸.
A better proof is to take the hint in Exercise 2.3.8 on Page 83 of [2]: using the
smallest subformula closed set that includes ϕ and is closed under prefixing ✷ for
filtration (assuming L✸ is our formal language). We give the complete proof as
follows for reference of teaching.
Definition 8. Given a set of formulas Σ ⊆ L✸ and a model M = (W,R, V ), Σ has
finite base with respect to M, if there exists a finite set ∆ ⊆ L✸ such that for every
ϕ ∈ Σ there exists ψ ∈ ∆ such that for all w ∈ W , M, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= ψ.
The following two propositions are easily verified.
Proposition 9. If Σ has finite base with respect to M, then all filtrations of M
through Σ is a finite model.
Proposition 10. The following formulas are valid in Euclidean frames.
(1) ✸✸✸ϕ↔ ✸✸ϕ, ✷✷✷ϕ↔ ✷✷ϕ
(2) ✸✸✷ϕ↔ ✸✷ϕ, ✷✷✸ϕ↔ ✷✸ϕ
(3) ✸✷✸ϕ↔ ✸✸ϕ, ✷✸✷ϕ↔ ✷✷ϕ
(4) ✸✷✷ϕ↔ ✸✷ϕ, ✷✸✸ϕ↔ ✷✸ϕ
Proposition 11. K5 has finite model property.
Proof. It suffices to prove that a filtration of any Euclidean model is also Euclidean.
Given ϕ /∈ K5, let Σ be the the smallest subformula closed set that includes ϕ
and is closed under prefixing ✷. By Proposition 10, Σ has finite base with respect
to Euclidean models. Suppose M = (W,R, V ) is Euclidean. Consider the largest
filtration Mf = (W f , Rl, V f ) of M through Σ. We prove that Mf is also Euclidean.
Suppose |w|Rl|u| and |w|Rl|v|. We prove |u|Rl|v|. Suppose ✸ψ ∈ Σ and M, v |= ψ.
It suffices to prove M, u |= ✸ψ. By M, v |= ψ and |w|Rl|v|, we have M, w |= ✸ψ.
Since M is Euclidean, it follows that M, w |= ✷✸ψ. By the construction of Σ, we
have ✷✸ψ ∈ Σ. Then by Remark 3 and |w|Rl|u|, we obtain M, u |= ✸ψ.
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3 Minimal Canonical Model and Finite Model Prop-
erty
Given any normal modal logic Λ, if ϕ /∈ Λ then it is easily seen that the canonical
model of Λ is a counter-model of ϕ. But standard canonical models are not finite
models. By constructing canonical models using maximal consistent sets relative to
a finite set of formulas, we can prove the finite model property of some logics. Such
canonical models are called minimal canonical models. The accessibility relations of
minimal canonical models for different logics are usually defined differently. In the
sequel, we will show an easily made mistake in defining minimal canonical models,
by taking the logic KL as an example.
Given any ϕ, let Sub−ϕ = {¬ψ | ψ ∈ Subϕ}. Let Sub+ϕ = Subϕ∪Sub−ϕ. Given
a logic Λ and a formula ϕ, Γ is Λ-maximal-consistent relative to ϕ, if Γ ⊆ Sub+ϕ is
Λ-consistent, and for all ψ ∈ Subϕ, ψ ∈ Γ or ¬ψ ∈ Γ.
Definition 12. Given a formula ϕ, define the minimal canonical model MKLϕ =
(WKLϕ , R
KL
ϕ , V
KL
ϕ ) relative to ϕ for KL as follows.
(1) WKLϕ = {Γ ⊆ Sub
+ϕ | Γ is Λ-maximal-consistent relative to ϕ}.
(2) For all w, u ∈ WKLϕ , wR
KL
ϕ u iff for all ψ ∈ L✸, if ✸ψ ∈ u or ψ ∈ u then
✸ψ ∈ w, and there exists ✸χ ∈ w but ✸χ /∈ u.
(3) For all w ∈ WKLϕ , if p ∈ PV ∩ Sub
+ϕ, then w ∈ V KLϕ (p) iff p ∈ w; if
p ∈ PV − Sub+ϕ then V KLϕ (p) is an arbitrary subset of W
KL
ϕ (for instance,
the empty set).
Remark 13. Unlike canonical models, in defining accessibility relations of minimal
canonical models, we can not freely choose ✷ or ✸, but have to choose it according
to which is primitive in the formal language. Definition 12 only applies to the case
that ✸ is primitive. If the primitive modal operator is ✷, to prove the truth lemma
of minimal canonical models, (2) above should be replaced by (2′).
(2′) For all w, u ∈WKLϕ , wR
KL
ϕ u iff for all ψ, if ✷ψ ∈ w then ψ,✷ψ ∈ u and there
exists ✷χ ∈ u but ✷χ /∈ w.
Neither (2) nor (2′) implies the other (and hence they are not equivalent). The reason
is that, w and u here are not maximal consistent sets, but maximal consistent sets
relative to ϕ. They have maximality only for the subformulas of ϕ, not for all
formulas. Thus they do not have some properties of maximal consistent sets. For
instance, from ψ ∈ w and the logical equivalence of ψ and ψ′ it does not follow that
ψ′ ∈ w, because ψ′ may not be in Sub+ϕ. In particular, from ✸ψ /∈ w we can only
obtain ¬✸ψ ∈ w but not ✷¬ψ ∈ w.
Just at this place, [2] made an incautious mistake. Exercise 4.8.7 on Page 246
of this book is to prove the finite model property of KL. It gives a hint for proof:
define the canonical relation RKLϕ by: wR
KL
ϕ u iff for all ψ, if ✷ψ ∈ w then ψ,✷ψ ∈ u,
and there exists ✷χ ∈ u but ✷χ /∈ w. This definition is just (2′) above instead of
(2). But [2] takes ✸ to be primitive rather than ✷. This implies that the correct
hint should be (2) rather than (2′). We guess that the hint was copied from other
sources which take ✷ to be primitive and was forgotten to be revised accordingly.
This might be a careless mistake. But it could also be that the authors thought (2)
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and (2′) are just equivalent. If the latter is the case, then our correction could be of
more significance.
Of course, we could take both ✷ and ✸ to be primitive in the formal language.
Then subformulas are clearer, which will cause less mistakes. But then in defin-
ing filtration and (minimal) canonical models, we have to consider both ✷ and ✸.
Moreover, in proving some critical results (such as the truth lemma of canonical
models), we have to consider both the cases ϕ = ✷ψ and ϕ = ✸ψ. Though it does
not increase difficulty, the proof will become more tedious. From the perspective of
writing textbooks, taking only one modal operator as primitive is definitely more
convenient (but requires more care).
4 Deductive Consequence and the Deduction The-
orem
Another easily made mistake is regarding the rule of necessitation RN as having
the same effect as the rule of modus ponens. Though both preserve validity, they
are different in preserving truth. Modus ponens preserves local truth, i.e., for every
world w, ψ is truth at w as long as ϕ and ϕ→ ψ are true at w. Necessitation does
not preserve local truth: from the truth of ϕ at w it does not follow that ✷ϕ is true
at w. Necessitation only preserves global truth, i.e., for every model M, if ϕ is true
at all wolds in M, then ϕ is true at all worlds in M.4
As the rule of necessitation does not preserve local truth, it can not be applied to
inferences with premises. This implies that when defining the deductive consequence
⊢Λ for a modal logicΛ, we can not follow the definition used for classical propositional
logic, which is defined by: Γ ⊢Λ ϕ iff there exists a finite sequence of formulas
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that ϕn = ϕ and for each ϕi, either ϕi ∈ Γ, or ϕi is an axiom of Λ,
or ϕi is obtained from proceeding formulas in the sequence using inference rules of
Λ. If this definition is adopted for modal logic, then as long as Λ contains the rule
of necessitation, we have p ⊢Λ ✷p. But the inference from p to ✷p is usually invalid:
from it is raining today, we can not infer that it is necessary that it is raining today.
The understanding of the rule of necessitation is also related to the deduction
theorem in modal logic. Indeed, whether the deduction theorem holds for modal
logic had caused debate in the literature.[10] To get the rule of necessitation right,
there are six ways of defining deductive consequence in modal logic in the literature.5
The first way is called omitted definition (as in [12]). This definition does not
consider inferences with premises, and considers only weak soundness and weak
completeness. Then the rule of necessitation can only be applied to axioms and
theorems derived from axioms, and will thus avoid the incorrect application of it.
The practice which considers only theorems and not consequences was reasonable
early when logicians cared only about the relation between logic and mathematics.
But with the development of more and more non-classical logics, theorems of an
axiomatic system can not completely characterize a logic any more.6 The practice
4See [1, 7] and [18] for the distinction of these two kinds of rules.
5In the sequel, we only consider deductive consequence defined in axiomatic systems, and will
not consider other proof systems (like sequent calculus and tableau systems).
6For example, Kleene’s three valued logic does not have any theorems, but it has valid inferences.
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which considers only theorems and not consequences is gradually abandoned. A
bit surprisingly, a relatively new and popular textbook [19] also adopts omitted
definition.
The second way is called classical definition (as in [3] and [6]). This definition
follows the standard definition of deductive consequence for classical propositional
logic and transfers the treatment of the rule of necessitation to the deduction theo-
rem, which either has different contents (as in [3]) or is augmented with additional
constraints. The latter is also the treatment for the rule of universal generalization
in some early textbooks ([11]) in mathematical logic. There are two drawbacks of
classical definition. First, the deduction theorem is made too complicated, which is
not friendly to students. Second, there is no strong soundness under this definition,
which means the deductive consequence does not characterize valid inferences.
The third way is called ternary definition (as in [8]). In this definition, premises
are divided into two parts: a global part and a local part. The notation Γ ⊢Λ ∆⇒ ϕ
means that ϕ can be deduced from global premises Γ and local premises∆.7 The rule
of necessitation can be applied to global premises but not to local premises. Thus,
the deduction becomes a ternary relation. Accordingly, the deduction theorem splits
into two for the two kinds of premises. As this definition is too distinctive, it has
not been widely adopted.
The fourth way is called reduced definition (as in [13] , [4], [2], [9], and open text-
book [20]). In this definition, Γ ⊢Λ ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Φ of Γ such that∧
Φ → ϕ8 has a formal proof in Λ. The essential idea is to reduce deduction with
premises to that without premises. Since ⊢Λ p → ✷p usually does not hold, under
this definition p ⊢Λ ✷p does not hold either, and hence the deductive consequence
accords to the semantics. Moreover, the deduction theorem holds almost trivially
without any constraints. The rule of uniform substitution can also be explicit with-
out hidden in axiom schemata. Under this definition, system K and its deductive
consequence is defined as follows.
Definition 14 (reduced definition). The axiomatic system Kr consists of the fol-
lowing axioms and rules of inference.
PC1 p→ (q → p)
PC2 (p→ (q → r)→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
PC3 (¬p→ ¬q)→ (q → p)
K ✷(p→ q)→ (✷p→ ✷q)
dual ✸p↔ ¬✷¬p
MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
RN
ϕ
✷ϕ
7Fitting’s original notation is Γ ⊢Λ ∆ −→ ϕ. To distinguish −→ from material implication in
the object language, we use ⇒ instead.
8If Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} then
∧
Φ = ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn; if Φ = ∅ then
∧
Φ = ⊤.
10
US
ϕ
ϕσ
, where σ is any substitution.9
We say ϕ is derivable from Γ in Kr, denoted Γ ⊢Kr ϕ, if there exists a finite subset Φ
of Γ such that
∧
Φ→ ϕ has a formal proof in Kr, i.e., there exists a finite sequence
of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that ϕn = ϕ, and for each ϕi, either ϕi is an axiom
of Kr, or is obtained from proceeding formulas in the sequence using the rules of
inference of Kr. We abbreviate ∅ ⊢Kr ϕ as ⊢Kr ϕ.
Reduced definition is the most popular one in modal logic for deductive conse-
quence. But it has three drawbacks. First, it is not as intuitive as classical definition,
especially for students who learned classical definition in classical propositional logic
before. Without explanation, they may be confused why in modal logic the definition
has to be modified. Second, technically the definition relies on the logical constant
→10. But not all logical languages contain this logical constant. Thereby, reduced
definition is not general enough. Third, though the deduction theorem holds under
this definition, it has no practical use at all. To prove ϕ → ψ, we can not assume
ϕ and prove ψ (so the proof may go easier) but have to prove ϕ→ ψ directly, since
ϕ ⊢Λ ψ is just defined by ⊢Λϕ→ ψ.
The fifth way is called bounded definition (as in [10]). This definition restricts the
use of the rule of necessitation, so that it can only be applied to conclusions derived
from empty premises. Under this definition, the deduction theorem also holds with-
out constraints. Compared to the above definitions, it has more advantages. But it
can not be easily defined precisely in standard forms of axiomatic systems.11Here we
give a precise definition that is closer to standard axiomatic systems, taking system
K as an example.
Definition 15 (bounded definition). The axiomatic system Kb consists of the fol-
lowing axiom schemata and rules of inference.
sPC1 ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ)
sPC2 (ϕ→ (ψ → χ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
sPC3 (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ)
sK ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ)
sdual ✸ϕ→ ¬✷¬ϕ
MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
RN
ϕ
✷ϕ
9For any σ : PV → L✸, ϕσ is inductively defined as follows. pσ = σ(p), (¬ψ)σ = ¬ψσ ,
(ψ → χ)σ = ψσ → χσ, (✸ψ)σ = ✸ψσ .
10The other logical constant ∧ can be eliminated by defining Γ ⊢Λ ϕ by: there exists
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ Γ such that ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → · · · → (ϕn → ϕ) · · · ) has a formal proof in Λ.
11The definition in [10] is not given in standard forms of axiomatic systems but in a form more
like sequent calculus.
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A finite sequence of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is a formal proof of ϕ in K
b from empty
premises, if ϕn = ϕ, and for each ϕi
• either ϕi is an instance of one of the axiom schema of Kb, or
• there exists j, k < i such that ϕk = ϕj → ϕi, i.e., ϕi can be obtained from
proceeding formulas in the sequence using the rule MP, or
• there exists j < i such that ϕi = ✷ϕj , i.e., ϕi can be obtained from a proceed-
ing formula in the sequence using RN.
We say ϕ is derivable from Γ in Kb, denoted Γ ⊢Kb ϕ, if there exists a finite sequence
of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that ϕn = ϕ and for each ϕi,
• either ϕi ∈ Γ, or
• ϕi is an instance of one of the axiom schema of Kb, or
• there exists j, k < i such that ϕk = ϕj → ϕi, i.e., ϕi can be obtained from
proceeding formulas in the sequence using the rule MP, or
• there exists j < i such that ϕi = ✷ϕj , and there exists ϕj1 , . . . , ϕjk ∈
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕj} such that ϕj1 , . . . , ϕjk is a formal proof of ϕj in K
b from empty
premises.
We abbreviate ∅ ⊢Kb ϕ by ⊢Kb ϕ.
We list some easily proved results for ⊢Kb without proofs.
Lemma 16. ⊢Kb ϕ→ ϕ.
Theorem 17 (Deduction Theorem). If Γ, ψ ⊢Kb ϕ, then Γ ⊢Kb ψ → ϕ.
Theorem 18 (Compactness). Γ ⊢Kb ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Φ of Γ such
that Φ ⊢Kb ϕ.
Corollary 19 (Derivation Theorem). Γ ⊢Kb ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Φ of Γ
such that ⊢Kb
∧
Φ→ ϕ.
The derivation theorem indicates that the deduction relation ⊢Kb can be charac-
terized by the theorems of Kb. The next theorem is used for proving Theorem 27.
Theorem 20 (Substitution Theorem). If⊢Kb ϕ then ⊢Kb ϕ
σ, for any substitution
σ.
The sixth way is called deflationary definition. This definition hides the rule of
necessitation in axiom schemata, so that the set of axioms is closed under prefixing
✷. Then the rule of necessitation is redundant. According to [10], this definition
was suggested in [17] for provability logic. The idea may come from some textbooks
in mathematical logic (as [5]) , in which the rule of universal generalization is hid-
den in axiom schemata so that the set of axioms is closed under taking universal
quantification. The advantage of this definition is that we can follow the standard
definition of deductive consequence in classical propositional logic without destroy-
ing the deduction theorem, and strong soundness is also maintained. Unfortunately,
no textbooks in modal logic adopts this definition. That said, this definition also
has a drawback. For logics that does not contain RN but only weaker rules like RE,
this definition is not applicable any more.
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In the sequel, we take K as an example to give the precise deflationary definition
and show its equivalence to reduced definition and bounded definition for reference
of teaching.
Definition 21 (deflationary definition). The set of axioms ΞKd of the axiomatic
system Kd includes
(PC1) p→ (q → p)
(PC2) (p→ (q → r)→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
(PC3) (¬p→ ¬q)→ (q → p)
(K) ✷(p→ q)→ (✷p→ ✷q)
(dual) ✸p↔ ¬✷¬p, and satisfies the following conditions.
• It is closed under necessitation, i.e., if ϕ ∈ ΞKd then ✷ϕ ∈ ΞKd .
• It is closed under substitution, i.e., if ϕ ∈ ΞKd then ϕ
σ ∈ ΞKd , where σ is any
substitution.
• No other formulas are in ΞKd .
The only rule of inference of Kd is
(MP)
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
A finite sequence of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is a formal proof of ϕ from Γ in K
d, if
ϕ = ϕn and for each ϕi,
• either ϕi ∈ Γ, or
• ϕi ∈ ΞKd , or
• there exist j, k < i such that ϕk = ϕj → ϕi, i.e., ϕi is obtained from proceeding
formulas in the sequence using modus ponens.
We say ϕ is derivable from Γ in Kd, denoted Γ ⊢Kd ϕ, if there is a formal proof of
ϕ from Γ in Kd. We abbreviate ∅ ⊢Kd ϕ as ⊢Kd ϕ.
Theorem 22 (Deduction Theorem). If Γ, ψ ⊢Kd ϕ, then Γ ⊢Kd ψ → ϕ.
Theorem 23 (Compactness). Γ ⊢Kd ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Φ of Γ such
that Φ ⊢Kd ϕ.
Corollary 24 (Derivation Theorem). Γ ⊢Kd ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Φ of
Γ such that ⊢Kd
∧
Φ→ ϕ.
The derivation theorem indicates that the deduction relation ⊢Kd can be char-
acterized by the theorems of Kd.
Theorem 25 (Generalization Theorem). If Γ ⊢Kd ϕ then ✷Γ ⊢Kd ✷ϕ.
The following results is easily obtained from the generalization theorem.
Corollary 26. Kd has the following admissible rules.12
12A rule
Γ
ϕ
is admissible in S, if for any substitution σ, ⊢S Γ
σ implies ⊢S ϕ
σ , where ⊢S Γ
σ
means ⊢S ψ
σ for all ψ ∈ Γ.
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(1)
ϕ
✷ϕ
(2)
ϕ→ ψ
✷ϕ→ ✷ψ
(3)
ϕ↔ ψ
✷ϕ↔ ✷ψ
(4)
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn → ϕ
✷ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧✷ϕn → ✷ϕ
Theorem 27. ⊢Kr = ⊢Kb = ⊢Kd
Proof. We prove ⊢Kr ⊆ ⊢Kb ⊆ ⊢Ke ⊆ ⊢Kr .
⊢Kr ⊆ ⊢Kb : By Corollary 19, it suffices to prove that for all ϕ ∈ L✸, if ⊢Kr ϕ
then ⊢Kb ϕ. By induction on the length of the formal proof of ϕ in K
r. If ϕ is an
axiom of Kr, then it is also an instance of an axiom schema of Kb. Thus ⊢Kb ϕ. If
ϕ is obtained from ψ and ψ → ϕ using MP, then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kb ψ
and ⊢Kb ψ → ϕ. By MP of K
b, it follows that ⊢Kb ϕ. If ϕ = ✷ψ is obtained from ψ
using RN, then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kb ψ. Then ψ is derived from empty
premises. By the restricted RN of Kb, ⊢Kb ✷ψ, i.e., ⊢Kb ϕ. If ϕ = ψ
σ is obtained
from ψ by US, by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kb ψ. By Theorem 20, ⊢Kb ψ
σ, i.e.,
⊢Kb ϕ.
⊢Kb ⊆ ⊢Kd : By Corollary 19 and Corollary 24, it suffices to prove that for all
ϕ ∈ L✸, if ⊢Kb ϕ then ⊢Kd ϕ. By induction on the length of the formal proof of ϕ
in Kb. If ϕ is an instance of an axiom schema of Kb, then it is also an instance of an
axiom schema of Kd. Thus ⊢Kd ϕ. If ϕ is obtained from ψ and ψ → ϕ using MP,
then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kd ψ and ⊢Kd ψ → ϕ. By MP of K
d, ⊢Kd ϕ. If
ϕ = ✷ψ is obtained from ψ using RN, then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kd ψ. By
Corollary 26(1), ⊢Kd ✷ψ, i.e., ⊢Kd ϕ.
⊢Kd ⊆ ⊢Kr : By Corollary 24, it suffices to prove that for all ϕ ∈ L✸, if ⊢Kd ϕ
then ⊢Kr ϕ. By induction on the length of the formal proof of ϕ in Kd. If ϕ ∈ ΞKd ,
then we prove by further induction on ϕ. If ϕ ∈ {PC1,PC2,PC3,K, dual}, then
it is also an axiom of Kr. Thus ⊢Kr ϕ. If ϕ = ✷ψ and ψ ∈ ΞKd , then by the
inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kr ψ. Then by RN of Kr, ⊢Kr ✷ψ, i.e., ⊢Kr ϕ. If ϕ = ψσ
and ψ ∈ ΞKd ,then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kr ψ. Then by US of K
r, ⊢Kr ψσ,
i.e., ⊢Kr ϕ. Now we finish the case of ϕ ∈ ΞKe . If ϕ is obtained from ψ and ψ → ϕ
using MP, then by the inductive hypothesis, ⊢Kr ψ and ⊢Kr ψ → ϕ. By MP of Kr,
we have ⊢Kr ϕ.
The theorem says that the reduced definition, bounded definition, and defla-
tionary definition are all equivalent, which may help students to understand better
the concept of deduction consequence in modal logic. We can also adopt the most
convenient one among them according to the demand in applications or proofs in
different situations.
5 Conclusion
We discuss four common mistakes in the teaching and textbooks of modal logic.
The first one is missing the axiom ✸ϕ↔ ¬✷¬ϕ, when choosing ✸ as the primitive
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modal operator, misunderstanding that ✷ and ✸ are symmetric. The second one
is forgetting to make the set of formulas for filtration closed under subformulas,
when proving the finite model property through filtration, neglecting that ✷ϕ and
✸ϕ may be abbreviations of formulas. The third one is giving wrong definitions
of canonical relations in minimal canonical models that are unmatched with the
primitive modal operators. These three mistakes are all related to the choice of
primitive modal operators. The moral is that we can not take for granted that ✷
and ✸ are symmetric and can be chosen arbitrarily in certain definitions. They have
to be carefully selected according to which modal operator is taken as primitive.
The fourth mistake is misunderstanding the rule of necessitation, without know-
ing its distinction from the rule of modus ponens. We summarizes six methods
of defining deductive consequence in modal logic: omitted definition, classical def-
inition, ternary definition, reduced definition, bounded definition, and deflationary
definition, and show that the last three definitions are equivalent to each other.
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